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NOTES
Of Hoops, Labor Dupes and Antitrust
Ally-Oops: Fouling Out the Salary Cap*
INTRODUCTION
The primary objective of the antitrust statutes is to promote competition.'
The overriding goal of national labor legislation is to encourage the collective
bargaining process 2 an inherently anticompetitive practice.3 Labor and an-
titrust concerns therefore are in frequent collision. Accommodating these
conflicting national policies has provided a fertile source of judicial and
scholarly confusion.4 In giving effect to one congressional policy, encouraging
* The author gratefully acknowledges the cooperation of Mr. Jeffrey A. Mishkin, of
Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn, and Mr. Jeffrey S. Klein, of Weil, Gotshal & Manges,
in the preparation of this Note. Prior to publication, an advance copy of this Note was provided
to all parties in the Wood v. NBA appeal, see infra note 9. Portions of this Note were relied
on extensively by plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Elliott H. Pollack, without citation, in the preparation
of plaintiff's appellate brief in Wood and in oral arguments before the United States Court
of Appeals, Second Circuit.
1. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No.3, Int'l Bhd. of
Elec. Workers, 325 U.S. 797, 809-10 (1945).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982) provides in part:
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to
organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment,
or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain rec-
ognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices funda-
mental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out of the differences
as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of
bargaining power between employers and employees.
It is declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of
certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and
eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the practice
and procedures of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers
of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives
of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions
of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.
3. Labor unions are designed to reduce competition among employees concerning wages
and conditions of employment and to eliminate price competition between employers based on
those factors. As Justice Powell explained in Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters
Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S. 616 (1975), "Union success in organizing workers and stand-
ardizing wages ultimately will affect price competition among employers, but the goals of
federal labor law never could be achieved if this effect on business competition were held a
violation of the antitrust laws." Id. at 622.
4. A representative cross-sampling includes the following pieces: McCormick & McKinnon,
Professional Football's Draft Eligibility Rule: The Labor Exemption and the Antitrust Laws,
33 EmoRY L.J. 375 (1984); Roberts and Powers, Defining the Relationship Between Antitrust
Laws and Labor Law: Professional Sports and the Current Legal Battleground, 19 WM. &
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collective bargaining, courts must concomitantly subordinate the interests of
an equally forceful congressional mandate, preserving competitive markets. 5
Resolving this national policy dilemma requires according limited antitrust
immunity to certain union-employer agreements. 6 The availability of this
"labor exemption" turns on a balancing of competing national policy con-
siderations.
Ascribing weights to these respective interests is a delicate task. Despite
this fact, courts often proceed clumsily in their analysis, ignoring the unique
circumstances of certain labor-management arrangements. The professional
sports industry presents the paradigm. In this setting, judicial application
of the.labor exemption has involved a tortured exercise of restraint and good
intention. This attitude is reflected by the number of successful challenges
to long accepted, yet undeniably anticompetitive, player restraint mecha-
nisms.7
In determining whether the product of collective bargaining will be held
accountable to antitrust standards, the Eighth Circuit has attempted to reduce
the appropriate balancing of interests to a contrived, three prong inquiry."
The most recent application of this test involved the National Basketball
Association's highly publicized, seldom understood and frequently maligned
provision for maximum team salaries: the salary cap. 9 The salary cap, as its
MARY L. REV. 395 (1978); Note, Application of the Labor Exemption After the Expiration of
Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 164 (1982); Note,
The Battle of the Superstars: Player Restraints in Professional Sports, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 669
(1980); Note, The Eighth Circuit Suggest a Labor Exemption from Antitrust Laws for Collec-
tively Bargained Labor Agreements in Professional Sports, 21 ST. Louis U.L.J. 565 (1977);
Comment, The National Hockey League's Faceoff with Antitrust: McCourt v. California Sports,
Inc., 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 603 (1981); Casenote, Labor Exemption to the Antitrust Laws, Shielding
An Anticompetitive Provision Devised by an Employer Group in its Own Interest: McCourt
v. California Sports, Inc., 21 B.C.L. REV. 680 (1980).
5. In Allen Bradley Co. Justice Frankfurter succinctly characterized this national policy
dilemma:
[t]he result of all this is that we have two declared congressional policies which
it is our responsibility to try to reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive
business economy; the other to preserve the rights of labor to organize to better
its conditions through the agency of collective bargaining. We must determine
here how far Congress intended activities under one of these policies to neutralize
the results envisioned by the other.
Id. at 806.
6. Connell Constr. Co., 421 U.S. at 622.
7. See Smith v. Pro-Football, 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976) (successful challenge to
existing NFL draft), aff'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Mackey v. NFL, 407 F.
Supp. 1000 (D. Minn. 1975) (successful player challenge to NFL's "Rozelle Rule"), aff'd in
part, rev'd in part, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Kapp
v. NFL, 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (invalidating NFL draft, standard contract rules
and tampering provisions), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 907 (1979); Denver Rockets v. All Pro
Management, Inc. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (striking down NBA hardship rule);
But see Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972) (upholding baseball's antitrust exemption).
8, Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
9. In Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 5251 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), plaintiff, a top round draft
choice, brought an antitrust action to enjoin the NBA and the National Basketball Players
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name implies, is the latest in a long line of employer-devised market restraints
which suppress competitive bidding for player services. The salary cap is
embodied in the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding between the National
Basketball Association ("NBA") and the National Basketball Players As-
sociation ("Players Association"). 0 This memorandum modified and sup-
plemented the existing collective bargaining agreement between the parties.
This Note examines the application of the labor exemption to the salary
cap agreement. The discussion focuses specifically on the cap's impact on
the top draft choices selected in the annual player draft and on the unduly
anticompetitive character of that impact. Under the salary cap agreement,
whenever a team equals or exceeds its maximum allowable salary cap, it
may sign a first round draft pick only to a one year, $75,000 contract."
Although the cap is replete with exceptions for veteran NBA players, no
such loopholes exist to benefit entering players drafted by teams in excess
of cap limits. In these instances, the cap's anticompetitive repercussions are
greatly exaggerated.
The ensuing discussion consumes four interrelated issues. Part I traces the
evolution and scope of labor's antitrust exemption. In part II, the relevant
details of the salary cap are canvassed. Part III applies the labor exemption
framework to the salary cap agreement. Finally, in part IV, the salary cap
agreement is tested under section one of the Sherman Act22
This Note argues that, in the context of professional basketball, a proper
accommodation of labor and antitrust policy militates against extending
antitrust shelter to the salary cap agreement. Stripped of this protection, the
salary cap stands as a direct, unmitigated market restraint that restricts
competitive bidding for top round draft picks. It clearly is contrary to the
pro-competitive thrust of the Sherman Act. The salary cap, accordingly,
should be struck down as violative of the antitrust laws.
Association from enforcing several provisions of the existing collective bargaining agreement
between the parties. These included the salary cap, the player draft and the ban on player
corporations. The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied
plaintiff's preliminary injunction motion and affirmed the validity of the existing collective bargain-
ing agreement. Id. at 529-30. Judge Carter emphasized that plaintiff's allegations did not sup-
port a finding of irreparable harm. Id. at 530. On a cursory examination of the facts, the court
also accepted defendant's contention that the labor exemption barred plaintiff's challenge. In
reviewing that issue, Judge Carter engaged in the mechanical inquiry announced in Mackey,
543 F.2d at 614 and endorsed in McCourt v. California Sports, Inc. 600 F.2d 1193, 1197-98
(6th Cir. 1979). Id. at 528-29. The dispute currently is pending in the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
10. Memorandum of Understanding Between National Basketball Association and National
Basketball Players Association, § III C(l) and (2)(b) (April 18, 1983) [hereinafter Memorandum
of Understanding].
11. The Memorandum of Understanding provides that "a Team with a Team Salary at or
over the Maximum Team Salary may enter into a one-year Player Contract, without an option
clause, with a player selected in the College Draft at the minimum player salary then applicable
in the NBA." Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, § III (C)(2)(f) (emphasis added).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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I. THE LABOR EXEMPTION: AN OVERVIEW
A. The Mackey 3 Framework
Sections six4 and twenty 5 of the Clayton Act and the Norris-LaGuardia
Act 6 are the basic sources of organized labor's antitrust immunity. A line
13. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), aff'g in part, rev'g in part, 407 F. Supp.
1000 (D. Minn. 1975), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
14. Section 6 provides:
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing
contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and
operation of labor ... organizations ... or to forbid or restrain individual
members of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects
thereof; nor shall such organizations ... be held or construed to be illegal
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws.
15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982).
15. Section 20, in pertinent part, provides:
No restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the United
States ... in any case ... growing out of ... a dispute concerning terms or
conditions of employment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable injury to prop-
erty ... for which injury there is no adequate remedy at law ....
And no such restraining order or 'injunction shall prohibit any person or persons
... from terminating any relation of employment, or from ceasing to perform
any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by
peaceful means so to do; ... or from peacefully persuading any person to work
or to abstain from working; ... nor shall any of the acts specified in this
paragraph be considered or held to be violations of any law of the United States.
29 U.S.C. § 52 (1982).
16. Sections 4 and 5 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act in relevant part provide:
[4.] No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or growing out
of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested
in such dispute ... from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following
acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of
employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of any
employer organization, regardless of any such undertakings or promise as is
described in section [3] of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating or inter-
ested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or insurance,
or other moneys or things of value;
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in any labor
dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any action or suit
in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute,
whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other method not involving
fraud or violence;
(f) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of their
interests in a labor dispute;
[5.] No court of the United; States shall have jurisdiction to issue a restraining
order or temporary or permanent injunction upon the ground that any of the
persons participating or interested in a labor dispute constitute or are engaged in
an unlawful combination or conspiracy because of the doing in concert of the
acts enumerated in section [4] of this title.
29 U.S.C. §§ 104 to 105 (1982).
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of five Supreme Court17 cases has adumbrated the vague and imprecise
contours of labor's special exemption from antitrust prosecution. Extrapo-
lating from this precedent, the Eighth Circuit in Mackey v. National Football
League,'8 fashioned a three pronged inquiry to determine whether certain
labor-management agreements are to be extended limited non-statutory im-
munity from antitrust review. As stated by Judge Lay:
[w]e find the proper accommodation to be: First, the labor policy favoring
collective bargaining may potentially be given pre-eminence over the
antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily affects only the
parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second, federal labor
policy as implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement
sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject to collective bar-
gaining. Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to
the degree necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agree-
ment sought to be exempted is the product of bona fide arm's-length
bargaining.19
The degree to which Mackey accurately reflects the case law is somewhat
suspect. Fleshing out relevant legal analysis from self-serving dictum and
applying it to an industry as unique as professional sports is fraught with
dangers of overgeneralization. The Eighth Circuit, predictably, has fallen
prey to this temptation. The Mackey test represents a shorthand balance of
divergent policy considerations. To that extent, it is a useful analytical tool
in discussing market restraints imposed by the collective bargaining process.
Given the peculiarities of professional basketball and the imprecise nature
of the exemption, however, rote application of the Mackey indicia is prima
facie improper. An examination of the leading United States Supreme Court
decisions in this area is helpful in understanding the specific mechanics and
precise policy considerations underlying the Mackey inquiry. Contrasting the
principles laid down in Mackey with those addressed by the Supreme Court
and those embodied in relevant lower court precedent provides a compre-
hensive analytical framework in which to view the salary cap agreement.
B. The Statutory Exemption
United States v. Hutcheson,20 was the United States Supreme Court's first
opportunity to apply the combined labor and antitrust statutory framework
to union activities. Hutcheson involved a jurisdictional dispute between com-
peting unions. Defendant union, frustrated in its efforts to obtain desired
work, precipitated strike activities against several employers and boycotted
the product of one employer. Defendant was accused of violating section
one of the Sherman Act.2' Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion defined
17. See infra notes 20-61 and accompanying text.
18. 543 F.2d 606.
19. Id. at 614-15.
20. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
21. Id. at 220-22.
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the permissible boundaries of union conduct. Reviewing the ongoing judicial-
legislative tug of war,22 Justice Frankfurter emphasized that the Sherman
Act together with sections six and twenty of the Clayton Act and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act were to be read as "a harmonizing text of outlawry of labor
conduct. ' 23 Interlacing these conflicting congressional messages, Justice
Frankfurter observed that:
[s]o long as a union acts in its self-interest and does not combine with
non-labor groups, the licit and the illicit under § 20 are not to be
distinguished by any judgment regarding the wisdom or unwisdom, the
rightness or wrongness, the selfishness or unselfishness of the end of
which the particular union activities are the means. 24
The precise limits of Hutcheson's statutory exemption were clarified three
years later in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers.25 There, defendant union was charged with
violating sections one and two of the Sherman Act. It was asserted that
defendant had conspired with local manufacturers and contractors to elim-
inate competition in the New York City electrical equipment market.
26
22. Application of the antitrust laws to union activities first was considered in Loewe v.
Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908). The United States Supreme Court, in Loewe, held that a secondary
boycott instigated by the union violated the Sherman Act. Id. at 278. The impact of Loewe
was not lost on the nascent labor movement. Their viability threatened, the unions turned to
the political process for relief. In response to an intensive lobbying campaign, Congress passed
the Clayton Act in 1914. The Clayton Act was designed to immunize labor unions from the
sweep of antitrust legislation. Section 6 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1982), declared
that the labor of a human being was not an article of commerce and that nothing in the
antitrust statutes forbid the existence of labor unions. Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 52 (1982), constrained federal courts from enjoining labor-management controversies con-
cerning terms and conditions of employment. Ignoring this clear congressional mandate, the
United States Supreme Court in Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921),
severely narrowed the broad language embodied in the Clayton Act.
Like Loewe, Duplex involved the legality of secondary boycott tactics. Rejecting the union
argument that §§ 6 and 20 prohibited judicial intervention in these matters, the Supreme Court
held that "there is nothing in [§ 6 of the Clayton Act] to exempt such an organization [a
union] or its members from accountability where it or they depart from its normal and legitimate
object and engage in an actual combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade." Id. at 469.
Justice Pitney interpreted § 20 of the Clayton Act to apply only to labor disputes concerning
the immediate employer-employee relationship. Id. at 472-74.
Its express intentions frustrated, Congress again spelled out its pro-labor bent in the passage
of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C § 101 (1982). Enacted in 1932, the Norris-LaGuardia
Act broadened the meaning of the term labor dispute to include "any controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment ... regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in
the proximate relation of employer and employee." 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1982). The Act also
specifically enumerated several practices which were not subject to restraining orders or in-
junctions. See supra note 16. Three years later, Congress again expressed its pro-labor sentiments
in the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (current
version at 29 U.S.C. § 151-68 (1982)). The Wagner Act explicitly enunciated the strong national
policy in favor of collective bargaining and the corresponding aversion to judicial intervention
in labor controversies. See supra note 2.
23. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. at 231.
24. Id. at 232.
25. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
26. Plaintiff was an electrical equipment manufacturer located outside of New York City.
Defendant had waged an aggressive campaign to obtain closed shop agreements with local New
[Vol. 62:95
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The United States Supreme Court held that the statutory exemption rec-
ognized in Hutcheson was unavailable where the union had combined with
a group of employers to eliminate competition from the product market.27
This was true even though the union was pursuing legitimate objectives:
higher wages, shorter hours and expanded membership opportunities. 28 Jus-
tice Black stressed that unions were not vehicles to assist employers in
violating the Sherman Act. 29
Allen Bradley is the logical corollary of Hutcheson. These cases demon-
strate that union activities are statutorily immune from antitrust review where
the union has acted alone and pursued legitimate objectives. These decisions
did not reach the question of whether the product of the collective bargaining
process would be held accountable to antitrust standards. Twenty years later,
the companion cases of Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters
v. Jewel Tea Co.3 0 and UMW v. Pennington,3 squarely faced that issue.
C. The Evolution of the Non-Statutory Exemption: Justice
White's Framework
In Jewel Tea, plaintiff, a meat retailer, challenged a marketing hours
restriction incorporated in an industry wide collective bargaining agreement. 2
Plaintiff claimed the restriction violated sections one and two of the Sherman
Act by impeding its ability to compete freely and effectively in the product
market. The United States Supreme Court held that the marketing hours
provision obtained by the union "through bona fide, arm's-length bargaining
in pursuit of their own labor union policies and not at the behest of or in
combination with non-labor groups" 3 was entitled to non-statutory exemp-
tion from the Sherman Act. 34
Justice White explained the grant of immunity in terms of competing
policy considerations. He emphasized that "[t]he crucial determinant is not
York City electrical equipment manufacturers and contractors. The resulting union-manufac-
turer-contractor combination "achieved 'a complete monopoly which they used to boycott
equipment manufactured by plaintiffs.' " Id. at 800 (quoting Allen Bradley, 145 F.2d 215, 220
(2d Cir. 1944)). This arrangement was highly successful from all standpoints. Local business
experienced phenomenal growth. The number of available jobs for union members increased.
Electrical equipment prices skyrocketed, union wages rose and worker's hours were shortened.
Allen Bradley, 325 U.S. at 800.
27. Id. at 809.
28. Id. at 807-11.
29. Id. at 810.
30. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
31. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
32. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 681. Jewel Tea concerned the legality of a provision restricting
night meat market operations. Plaintiff was a member of a multi-employer bargaining unit of
meat retailers. Defendant union represented virtually all butchers in the Chicago area. During
contract negotiations between the two groups, defendant insisted on including the marketing
hours restriction in the collective bargaining agreement. Plaintiff objected but ultimately signed
the agreement under threat of strike. Id. at 680-81.
33. Id. at 690.
34. Id. See infra note 43, for a discussion of the nonstatutory exemption.
1986]
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the form of agreement ... but its relative impact on the product market
and the interests of union members." 3s In this context, the "interests of
union members" subsumed two overlapping national labor policies: 1) en-
couraging the collective bargaining process on subjects of union-employer
concern a6 and 2) advancing the vital interests of union members.37 Where,
as in the instant setting, the challenged agreement furthered both national
labor policies,38 Justice White was willing to tolerate the corresponding
product market impact.3 9 Justice White carefully distinguished that situation
from one where the vital interests of union members were left unaffected
by the challenged agreement. In the latter instance, labor policy clearly did
not require shielding the agreement from antitrust scrutiny.4 This point was
illustrated in Pennington.
In Pennington, defendant United Mine Workers was accused of conspiring
with several large coal operators to restrain competition in the product
market. 4' As part of an industry-wide plan to combat overproduction,
defendant entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a handful of
industry giants. In exchange for substantial wage increases, defendant agreed
to limit the sale of nonunion coal, to impose the terms of the agreement
on all industry members, irrespective of size or ability to pay, and not to
oppose rapid industry mechanization. 42 Defendant contended that the chal-
lenged agreement was entitled to limited non-statutory immunity since it
related to wages, a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 43
Rejecting that argument, Justice White applied the very same balancing
considerations announced in Jewel Tea." The fact that the agreement related
to a mandatory subject of collective bargaining was not dispositive. 4s A
35. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 690 n.5.
36. Id. at 689.
37. Id. at 690-92. For a comprehensive discussion on this interpretation see Casenote, supra
note 4, at 680.
38. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-97. The marketing hours restriction was "intimately related"
to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment. Id. at 689-90. Section 8(d) of
the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") requires employers and unions to bargain on
these matters. Id. at 690; 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982). Upholding the agreement therefore promoted
the collective bargaining policy underlying the Act. See supra note 2 for an overview of policy
concerns embodied in the NLRA. The marketing hours restriction also advanced the vital
interests of union butchers. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 692. Justice White stressed that the provision
was obtained "not as a result of a bargain between the unions and some employers directed
against other employers, but pursuant to what the unions deemed to be in their own labor
union interests." Id. at 688. Cf. infra notes 42-50. and accompanying text.
39. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 689-97.
40. Id. at 692-93.
41. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 659.
42. Id. at 660.
43. Id. at 664. Justice White, writing for a plurality, initially noted that neither the Clayton
Act nor the Norris-Laguardia Act specifically dealt with union-employer agreements. Antitrust
immunity, if available, therefore was to be distinguished from the statutory type conferred in
Hutcheson and denied in Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers,
325 U.S. 797 (1945). Id. at 661-64.
44. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
45. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65.
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mandatory subject classification merely fulfilled the collective bargaining
concern underlying the labor half of the balance.4 The self-interest element
clearly was lacking.47 Justice White stressed that the agreement ran counter
to the interests of defendant's members. By agreeing to impose industry-
wide wage standards, defendant had surrendered its freedom of action with
respect to its bargaining policy.48 Union concerns therefore were short-
changed. Unlike Jewel Tea, the product market impact stood alone, un-
mitigated and unjustified by the vital interests of defendant's members. 49
The non-statutory exemption consequently was denied.5"
Ten years later, the United States Supreme Court in Connell Construction
Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100,5 endorsed Justice White's bal-
ancing approach. In Connell, plaintiff contractor filed Sherman Act claims
against defendant union seeking to invalidate the terms of an existing hot
cargo agreement.53 Defendant claimed the labor exemption shielded the agree-
ment from Sherman Act prosecution.5 4 Justice Powell rejected defendant's
contentions, proclaiming that "[lI]abor policy clearly does not require ...
that a union have freedom to impose direct restraints on competition among
those who employ its members." 5 In so doing, he noted that the effect of
the hot cargo agreement was to exclude nonunion subcontractors from the
product market.' This direct market restraint was not the result of any
activity embraced by national labor policy. Justice Powell pointed out that
defendant had no interest in representing plaintiff's employees.57 Neither
national labor policy, promoting the collective bargaining process or ad-
vancing legitimate union concerns therefore was forwarded by defendant's
coercive tactics.58 The labor side of the balance clearly was lacking. The
elimination of competition in the product market stood alone as an unmi-
tigated market restraint.
In determining whether union-employer agreements are to receive limited
non-statutory immunity, Justice White's framework balances labor policies
46. Id.
47. Id. at 668.
48. Id. at 666-68.
49. Id. at 665-66; Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 692.
50. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 669.
51. 421 U.S. 616 (1975).
52. Id. at 622.
53. Id. at 620-21. Defendant union staged an organizational campaign designed to bring in
local subcontractors. As part of it strategy, defendant compelled reluctant contractors, including
plaintiff, to enter into a series of "hot cargo" agreements. These agreements obligated local
contractors to employ only those subcontractors party to defendant's current collective bar-
gaining agreement. Defendant induced plaintiff and other contractors to sign the agreements
by picketing their major construction sights. Plaintiff sued to invalidate the hot cargo clauses
and to enjoin defendant from further picketing. Id. at 618-21.
54. Id. at 619.
55. Id. at 622.
56. Id. at 623.
57. Id. at 625-26.
58. Id.
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against antitrust concerns. Labor policies are twofold: encouraging collective
bargaining and advancing union interests. Antitrust concerns are singular:
preserving competitive markets. Jewel Tea demonstrates that where both
labor policies are advanced, market interferences will be tolerated. 9 Connell
teaches that where neither labor policy is promoted and market impact is
substantial, antitrust immunity will not be forthcoming. 60 Pennington implies
that where only one labor policy is furthered and market competition is
eliminated, the non-statutory exemption will be denied. 6' These principles
embody the critical interests underlying the Mackey balance. 62 Applied along-
side the Mackey criteria,63 they provide a powerful analytical device with
which to examine the salary cap agreement.
II. THE SALARY CAP
On April 18, 1983, the NBA and the Players Association entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding that modified and supplemented the existing
collective bargaining agreement between the parties.Y As part of that agree-
ment, maximum and minimum team salaries were established. 6 These limits
apply to certain teams and are computed on the players' share of defined
gross revenues.6
Since its implementation, the salary cap has received mixed reviews. Most
often, the cap has been lambasted as an artificial market constraint that
frustrates would-be trades 7 and generates unprecedented league confus-
59. See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
60. See supra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
61. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
62. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
63. Id.
64. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10.
65. Id. at III.
66. Id. at Ill C(3)-(4). Because the salary pool is linked to a percentage of revenue, the
salary cap functions as a primitive form of revenue sharing between labor and management.
Calculation of the cap is cumbersome but relatively straightforward. Projected defined league
revenues are totalled, multiplied by 53% and apportioned evenly among the twenty-three member
clubs. Welling, Tasini & Cook, Basketball: Business is Booming, Bus. WK., Oct. 28, 1985, at
78.
67. Trades foregone and acquisitions frustrated due to cap intrusions are too numerous to
document. For an extensive account of the cap's chill on player mobility, see Note, The National
Basketball Association Salary Cap: An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. Ray. 157 (1985).
This aspect of cap operations most recently impeded the Seattle Supersonics' efforts at peddling
perennial All-Pro center Jack Sikma to the Dallas Mavericks.
As the 1986 NBA draft deadline neared, the Sonics desperately sought to unload Sikma
and his hefty $1.6 million salary. In exchange for Sikma, Dallas reportedly offered power
forward Bill Wennington ($220,000 in salary next year), swingman Jay Vincent ($315,000 annual
salary) and the number seven pick in the NBA draft; which became the University of Michigan's
6'11 " All-American center, Roy Tarpley. But Dallas, which also had hoped to trade All-Pro
forward Mark Aguirre ($715,000 per year), checked the relevant salary figures and was forced
to withdraw from negotiations. Richardson, Salary Cap Keeps Sikma from Mavs, Seattle Post
Intelligencer, June 19, 1986, sec. B, at 1, col. I.
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ion." Neither party to the modified collective bargaining agreement appears
genuinely satisfied with the cap's operation. Player support for the cap is
wavering.6 9 In response to accusations of owner-inspired collusion, union
officials have pledged to fight the cap at the next round of labor-management
negotiations. 70 Management's endorsement of the cap also has been less thah
Unable to accommodate Aguirre's trade demands, the Mavericks were catapulted $900,000
over their current cap of $4,067,000. Dallas' inability to squeeze Sikma's salary under cap
requirements sent Seattle scurrying for an alternative suitor. Id. Following two weeks of intensive
trade talks, the Sonics reached an agreement with the Milwaukee Bucks. In exchange for Sikma
and the Sonics' 1987 and 1989 second round draft picks, Seattle received Milwaukee's incon-
sistent reserve center, Alton Lister, and the Bucks' first round draft choices in 1987 and 1989.
Grady, Sonics, Bucks Satisfied with Sikma Trade, The Journal-American, July 2, 1986, sec.
B, at 1, col. 1. [hereinafter Sonics, Bucks Satisfied].
Sonic officials justified the lopsided swap primarily in salary cap terms. By unloading
Sikma's $1.6 million annual salary and replacing it with Lister's reported $300,000 paycheck,
the Sonics gained needed flexibility under the salary cap. This flexibility, the Sonics maintained,
allowed them to pursue available free-agents and also eliminated the cap as a potential im-
pediment in future dealings. Nelson, A Move for the Future, Seattle Times, July 2, 1986, sec.
B, at 2, col. 1. Defending the trade, Sonic General Manager, Lenny Wilkins, emphasized that
[n]ow we have a lot of flexibility. We're not saying we're going to run out and
make a deal tomorrow, but we've got all summer to look at what we want to
do and talk to teams.
Now we'll start to evaluate the; free-agent list and who is on other teams that
we can get.
Sonics, Bucks Satisfied, supra at 1, col. 1.
Despite this guarded optimism, response to the Lister acquisition proved hostile. The Sonic's
unabashed willingness to achieve financial flexibility at the expense of personnel instability
bewildered both league officials and commentators. See, e.g., Koivastic, Trade Leaves Sonics
with Carcass Instead of Nucleus, The Journal-American, July 2, 1986, sec. B, at 1, col. 2.
The Sonics essentially justified a bad trade by reference to cap compliance. This point illustrates
the folly of the present system. The salary cap purportedly was designed to maximize players'
free agency options. See infra notes 167-174 and accompanying text. The Sikma affair dem-
onstrates that the cap, instead, is acting as an unwieldy product market restraint. Apart from
chilling rookie paychecks, the cap is precluding veteran players from moving freely between
teams. One of the primary justifications underlying cap implementation therefore is being
completely frustrated.
68. "[T]he salary cap; it's tougher than the block-charge call or the criteria for a zone
defense." Boswell, Implausibilities Made It a Feast, Wash. Post, Dec. 26, 1984, (Sports), at 1
(elec. ed.). "In real life there are salary caps that make trades and free-agent acquisition so
difficult they provide a cottage industry for lawyers who are asked to help teams fathom the
cap's fine print." N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1985, at C1,12, col. 1. A recent example of this
misunderstanding involved a trade between the Los Angeles Clippers and the Dallas Mavericks.
The Mavericks acquired James Donaldson (who earns $515,000 this year and $560,000 next
season) from the Clippers in exchange for Kurt Nimphius (who has a two year contract at
$225,000 per annum). The Mavericks requested league assistance in interpreting the relevant
salary cap provision. The league provided the information, assuring the Mavericks that the
salary discrepancy between the traded players would not place the Mavericks in excess of cap
limits. After the trade had been completed, the league changed its ruling. The Mavericks were
forced to reduce their roster by one player to conform to cap requirements. The Mavericks
subsequently released previous starting center Wallace Bryant. Hubbard, Believe It or Not,
Salary Cap Works, The Sporting News, Jan. 6, 1986, at 39.
69. Welling & Tasini, supra note 66, at 78.
70. "You really can't call it collusion but in effect it is," says Larry Fleischer,
general counsel for the NBA Players Association. "Given the available talent
19861
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whole-hearted. A begrudging acceptance characterizes the majority attitude.'
At a more fundamental level, the twin objectives of the cap, limiting
player salaries and improving the ability of weaker teams to compete for
talent, 72 are not being realized. First, innovative salary structures have enabled
the more clever franchises to effectively circumvent the spirit, if not the
letter, of the cap.3 Such maneuvers have resulted in average player salary
increases of over fifty percent since the signing of the collective bargaining
there should be 10-12 more offer sheets presented than at the present. It's ridiculous
to think that none of these last-place teams haven't made offers, that a Cedric
Maxwell isn't more attractive to Indiana than he is to Boston."
Cotton, NBA: The Boredom Is Over, Wash. Post, Oct. 25, 1984, Sports, at I (elec. ed.).
Fleischer's sentiments are echoed by Washington Bullet star forward Greg Ballard, "They say
the new agreement will benefit all the players, but so far, it's really benefitted only the super,
super stars." Dupree, 60 Slated to Become Free Agents in NBA, Wash. Post, April 22, 1984,
Sports, at 8 (elec. ed.)
Even the so-called superstars, however, vigorously object to cap operation. Maurice Lucas,
Los Angeles Laker power forward, five time NBA all-star and active participant in the salary
cap negotiations insists that "[t]he system is not working .... You either have to be firm
and wait it out or sign for whatever they give you. I'd like to sign for my market value."
Goldpaper, Salary Cap Can Reshape NBA; Commissioner Optimistic, N.Y. Times, Oct. 26,
1984, at A25, col.l. See infra note 173 and accompanying text.
71. Jan Volk, General Manager of the Boston Celtics, opined that "[t]he cap has been
good for the league. At any one time I might curse it. It's limiting in the opportunities it
presents you. You have to be very creative." Welling & Tasini, supra note 66, at 78.
72. National Basketball Association's Memorandum in Support of Its Objection to the
Special Master's Ruling and Report at 7, In re National Basketball Association, 70 Civ. 1526
(RLC) (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 1986) [hereinafter Brief for NBA].
73. Illustrative of this point is the recent contract signed by Georgetown University's All-
American center, Patrick Ewing, with the New York Knickerbockers. Ewing's pact calls for a
$31.2 million payoff over ten years, the first six being fully guaranteed. A creative combination
of backloaded salary payments, deferred compensation and interest free loans enabled the
Knicks, backed by Gulf & Western's deep pocket, to meet Ewing's demands. The precise terms
of Ewing's contract are as follows:
Interest
Year Salary Deferred Free Loan Total
1985 $ 750,000 $- $ 500,000 $ 1,250,000
1986 1,000,000 - 500,000 1,500,000
1987 1,500,000 750,000 500,000 2,750,000
1988 2,000,000 750,000 500,000 3,250,000
1989 2,750,000 750,000 500,000 4,000,000
1990 3,000,000 750,000 500,000 4,250,000
1991 3,000,000 - 300,000 3,300,000
1992 3,000,000 - 300,000 3,300,000
1993 3,250,000 - 300,000 3,550,000
1994 3,750,000 - 300,000 4,050,000
Totals $24,000,000 $3,000,000 $4,200,000 $31,200,000
Vescey, The Fine Print of Ewing's Pact, N.Y. Post, Nov. 5, 1985, at 74, col. I.
Other attempts at skirting salary cap requirements, however, have proven less than successful.
In In re National Basketball Association, No. 70 Civ. 1526 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 6, 1986), District
Judge Carter held that the Knicks' free agent offer sheet to New York Net forward Albert
King constituted a "stark case of intentional circumvention" of the salary cap and therefore
violated Article III C (9) of the existing Modification Agreement. Id. slip op. at 5.
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agreement. 74 Second, league interpretation of the salary floor provision ef-
fectively has frustrated the egalitarian bidding process envisioned by the
cap's framers. The salary cap was designed to insure competitive bidding
parity; 75 low-salaried teams were to increase their numbers to established cap
levels76 while clubs with bloated payrolls were to be constrained from further
spending. The players also were to receive at least 53% of projected league
revenues in salaries and benefits-apportioned evenly among member fran-
chises.7 Clubs beneath these minimum limits were to either raise salaries or
increase pension benefits, two points now disputed by the NBA. The league
claims that teams below the cap need not increase their payrolls to comply
with minimum cap requirements and that teams with overinflated payrolls
may cover benefit payments for those clubs beneath the minimum level.7
This newly announced policy creates a disincentive for low-salaried teams
to spend more by going after available talent. These franchises instead simply
may look to the deep pockets of the league's money barons to satisfy cap
dictates. 79
The salary cap's economic underpinnings therefore are completely re-
moved. Low-salaried teams no longer are forced to choose between spending
money on player salaries or spending money 9n pension benefits. League
interpretation has created a much more attractive alternative: indefinite post-
ponement of dollar increases. Satisfying the cap's minimum floor feature
has been translated from an individual to an aggregate concept. This means
that combined league payments, rather than individual club payments, must
meet the minimum floor target of 53% of projected league revenues. This
shift in emphasis plainly defeats a central purpose of the salary cap: forcing
low-salaried clubs into a competitive bidding posture.
League Commissioner David L. Stern, chief architect of the salary cap,
adopts a paternalistic viewpoint when discussing its impact. "We still need
the cap to protect owners from themselves," claims Stern. 80 Stern recognizes
that harsh consequences flow from the cap's operation8' and acknowledges
74. Brief for NBA, supra note 72, at 6.
75. Id. at 7.
76. See Cotton, supra note 70, at 1. The salary cap was designed to present low-salaried
NBA franchises with a Hobson's choice. These clubs could satisfy the cap's minimum floor
requirement either by increasing team payrolls or by contributing to the union pension fund.
Given these possibilities, a club beneath cap limits necessarily should opt for the former
alternative. Forced to spend money, a going concern will do so in a manner that optimizes
self-interests. In the NBA this is accomplished by acquiring and maintaining top player talent,
not through intangible pension contributions. The salary cap therefore dictates that low-salaried
clubs pursue a more generous payroll strategy.
77. Id. at 1; Affidavit of Russell T. Granik, Executive Vice-President of NBA, at 14, Wood
v. NBA, 84 Civ. 6582 (RLC) (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 1984).
78. Cotton, supra note 70, at 1. See also infra note 170 and accompanying text.
79. See infra note 170 and accompanying text.
80. Welling & Tasini, supra note 66, at 78.
81. "Rules always are [harsh]. There are always cases where a particular team feels it is
being unfairly restrained, but that's life under the cap." Brenner, Stern Visualizes No Problems
for NBA, Indianapolis Star, Nov. 10, 1985, at 8, col. I.
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that support for the cap is far from uniform. 82 Despite these shortcomings,
the Commissioner insists that the cap is working, as evidenced by the league's
newly discovered financial stability. 3
Paragraph IIIC (2)(f) of the existing collective bargaining agreement pro-
vides that where a team equals or exceeds its salary cap, it may sign a first
round draft choice only to a one year, $75,000 contract. s4 The effect of this
provision is exacerbated by collective bargaining agreement Article XXII
governing the annual player draft.8 These sections combine to artificially
restrain competitive bidding among member NBA clubs and prevent pro-
spective NBA players from realizing their free market value. As one veteran
NBA general manager blithely observed, "[tleams over the salary cap have
a problem signing ... top rookie[s] .. .. -6 The salary cap, therefore,
deprives this elite group of their most treasured resource: a competitive
market. This impact on top draft choices will be the focal point of subsequent
discussion . 7
III. THE LABOR EXEMPTION AND THE SALARY CAP AGREEMENT
A. Special Considerations
Certain preliminary matters need to be addressed before applying the labor
exemption framework to the salary cap agreement. It should be clear that
82. "Whether it's [the cap] working depends on who you're asking." Id.
83. "To a person, the teams who understand it, recognize that it has brought a stability
that is wonderful. It has begun to blaze a trail, for how you can accommodate a star system
and individual contract negotiations with a need to keep 23 or more functioning, successful
entities." Id. (emphasis added). Stern also has commented that:
I think that the adoption of the salary cap, together with the drug program,
will some day be looked at historically as the turning point in the history of the
NBA .... There may be other reasons for success. But I think that when you
look at a system which has taken teams and League itself to a point where perhaps
as many as 15 teams will be profitable, where in the year before [it was] 11 and
the year before that eight and the year before that six at a time when ... the
average salary has gone from $270,000 to $330,000, you have to scratch your
head and say, "How is it possible that you had a system where it seems that
everything got better and both management and labor prospered but not at each
other's expense?" I think that the salary cap, together with the profit sharing, is
responsible for that, both in fact and generally, in that they allowed the sport to
proceed.
Cotton, David Stern with NBA Ratings, Revenues Up, Commissioner Sees Resurgence, Wash.
Post, June 23, 1985, Sports, at 1 (elec. ed.).
84. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at § III C(2)(f).
85. Collective Bargaining Agreement Between the National Basketball Association and the
National Basketball Players Association, art. XXII (Apr. 29, 1976). This article reserves the
exclusive negotiating rights to the drafted player to the drafting team for a period extending
up to the following year's draft. Where a player remains unsigned, he may re-enter the following
year's draft. The player conceivably could be re-selected by the original drafting team or by
another club at the defined cap limit. A potential draftee therefore may face the identical
predicament for two consecutive years. See infra note 142 and accompanying text.
86. Welling & Tasini, supra note 66, at 78.
87. See infra notes 88-234 and accompanying text.
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the statutory exemption was enacted to protect labor unions and their ac-
tivities.89 The realities of the collective bargaining process, however, dictate
that the exemption's protective shield extend derivative non-statutory im-
munity to employer groups. As the Eighth Circuit noted in Mackey v.
National Football League,8 9
[s]ince the basis of the non-statutory exemption is the national policy
favoring collective bargaining, and since the exemption extends to agree-
ments, the benefits of the exemption logically extend to both parties to
the agreement. Accordingly, under appropriate circumstances, we find
that a non-labor group may avail itself of the labor exemption.-
Unlike the challenged agreements in United States v. Hutcheson9' and its
progeny,92 the salary cap works to the disadvantage of a labor group:
prospective first round draft choices. The prior cases primarily were con-
cerned with union-employer agreements that worked to the detriment of
management's competitors, the product market.93 In the unique professional
sports industry, the labor-product market distinction noticeably is absent. It
is well established that for antitrust purposes, the product market in profes-
sional sports consists of individual player services. 94 The entertainment pack-
age consumed by the public cannot be limited to the generic sporting event.
Unlike the typical industry, consumer interest in professional sports is inex-
tricably linked to the employee market. The athletes themselves are the main
attraction-the true product market.95 Dwight Gooden's blazing fastball,
Julius Erving's aerial acrobatics and Patrick Ewing's menacing elbows and
vicious slam dunks are the ultimate objects of fan enjoyment.9 Attempts at
line drawing between product and labor markets therefore are meaningless.
In professional athletics, these markets virtually are synonymous.
88. See supra note 22.
89. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
90. Id. at 612.
91. 312 U.S. 219 (1941).
92. See supra notes 25-61 and accompanying text.
93. Id.
94. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 616-18. See also Robertson v. NBA, 389 F. Supp. 867, 883-84
(collecting cases).
95. For articles and notes supporting this proposition, see Roberts & Powers, supra note
4, at 460; Note, supra note 4, at 698-700.
96. This point cannot be overemphasized. In Dwight Gooden's eighteen 1985 Shea Stadium
starts, for example, the New York Mets drew 6,236 more fans per game than they averaged
in the other sixty-three home contests. The Mets estimated that the typical fan spends $13.50
per game. Apart from endorsement value, Gooden's mound presence therefore accounted for
an additional $1.5 million in club revenues. The Orlando Sentinal, Dec. 22, 1985, at C12, col.
3.
A more dramatic example is the impact of Patrick Ewing on ticket sales in the NBA. When
the New York Knickerbockers won the right to draft Ewing in the 1985 NBA lottery, officials
at Madison Square Garden (homecourt for the Knicks) were deluged with ticket orders. Sources
expect the Knicks to sell twice as many season tickets as last year. This would add at least
three million in team revenues. Lancaster, Mr. Ewing Goes to New York City: Who Owes
How Much to Whom-and Why, Wall St. J. May 24, 1985, at 1 [hereinafter Ewing Goes to
New York]. The Knicks already have sold out their most expensive season tickets-at $688
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The prospective superstar of the 1980's similarly bears little resemblance
to the industrial laborer envisioned by the framers of the National Labor
Relations Act.97 The advent of the athlete-agent corporate bargaining entity98
has rendered such comparisons obsolete. Traditional labor and antitrust
policy concerns consequently take on a new and different twist in the profes-
sional sports setting."
The task of unraveling these unique policy considerations will fall on the
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. That
court has retained exclusive jurisdiction for all disputes arising out of the
Oscar Robertson settlement agreement.'0 The existing NBA-Players Asso-
ciation collective bargaining agreement is a modification of that proceeding. 0'
Insofar as judicial pronouncements are to be weighed, it should be recog-
nized that this court will be the ultimate trier of fact in any future salary
cap litigation.1
0 2
B. The Mackey Criteria Applied to the Salary Cap Agreement
In immunizing certain union-employer agreements, Mackey strikes a short-
hand balance of competing policy considerations. 13 Mackey's requirements
are cumulative: each prong must be satisfied before antitrust immunity will
apiece. Welling & Tasini, supra note 66, at 73. "In dollars and cents, he's one of the ...
impact players'who will sell tickets and generate (other) revenue before he blocks a shot or
gets a rebound," says Carl Sheer, General Manager of the San Diego (now Los Angeles)
Clippers. Wash. Post, May 12, 1985, (Sports), at I (elec. ed.). NBA officials expect Ewing to
pump league interest, make franchises more valuable and further glamorize the league in the
eyes of advertisers, investors and the media. Ewing Goes to New York, supra; Welling &
Tasini, supra note 66, at 74.
Ewing's worth to Georgetown University, his alma mater, recently was documented at over
twelve million dollars. During Ewing's four year stay at Georgetown, attendance and television
revenues tripled, admissions soared, fund raising rose dramatically and sales of Georgetown
T-shirts and other university paraphernalia skyrocketed. Louisville Courier-Journal, Dec. 27,
1985, at D-4, col. 1. The combined effect of these increases vividly demonstrates the product
market qualities of today's superstar athlete.
97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1982).
98. For a brief overview of this topic, see Shulruff, The Football Lawyers, 71 A.B.A.J.,
Sept. 1985, at 45-47; Ward, Managing the Sports Stars, SKY, Aug. 1985, at 32-39.
99. Top draft choices, in some sports, are accustomed to receiving upwards of forty million
dollars in compensation. Shulruff, supra note 98, at 45-47; Ward, supra note 98, at 36. See
also supra note 73. Considered alongside endorsement revenues, these figures suggest that
today's top round draft picks are themselves commercial entities deserving of Sherman Act
protection. For an interesting discussion on this point, see Note, supra note 4, at 699.
100. Robertson v. NBA, 72 F.R.D. 64, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (Carter, J.), aff'd, 556 F.2d 682
(2d Cir. 1977).
101. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10.
102. This fact takes on critical significance because Judge Carter already has resolved several
of the key issues involved in a labor exemption analysis. Robertson, 389 F.Supp. at 881-90.
The importance of Mackey, and McCourt v. California Sports, Inc. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir.
1979), the only circuit court treatment of the subject, correspondingly is narrowed.
103. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614-15.
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attach.""4 As will be demonstrated, the salary cap is unable to pass muster
under two of the three prongs of the standard. The remaining criterion, the
mandatory subject requirement, is an irrelevance, unsupported by case law
and inapplicable to the salary cap analysis.
1. The Mandatory Subject Criterion05
Mandatory subjects of collective bargaining include wages, hours and other
terms and conditions of employment.106 Section 8(d) of the NLRA07 imposes
a good faith duty on employers and unions to bargain collectively with
respect to these matters. 08 Section 8(d) does not, however, compel either
party to alter its initial stance on an issue.109 These conflicting commands
often provide statutory impetus for industrial stalemate. Incorporating the
mandatory subject standard into the balancing equation therefore leads to
somewhat anomalous results. This is especially true considering the industry
involved and the subject matter under review. Wage negotiation in profes-
sional sports traditionally has been removed from the collective bargaining
process.110 Player's salaries are negotiated individually, not through union
efforts."' It seems absurd to condition a grant of immunity on a subject in
which labor interests clearly are lacking: individual salary negotiation. Yet
this is precisely what Mackey's mandatory subject indicia attempt to accom-
plish.
More importantly, however, the mandatory subject criterion runs counter
to existing case law. In support of this requirement, the Eighth Circuit, in
Mackey, " 2 provides two non-specific citations to UMW v. Pennington 3 and
Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co. 114 These
holdings, however, contain scant authority for exempting mandatory sub-
jects. Justice White, in fact, explicitly rejected that suggestion, stating that
"an agreement resulting from union-employer negotiations is [not] auto-
104. Id. at 614.
105. Id.; see supra text accompanying note 19.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1980).
107. Id. at §§ 151-69.
108. Id. at § 158(d), in relevant part, provides:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the
mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to
meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment ... but such obligation does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession
.... (emphasis added).
109. Id. See also McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1200, for an interpretation of this provision.
110. See L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND T E LAW 303, 324 (1977).
111. Id.
112. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 614.
113. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
114. 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
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matically exempt from Sherman Act scrutiny simply because the negotiations
involve a compulsory subject of bargaining, regardless of the subject or the
form and content of the agreement." '
Judge Carter, in Robertson v. National Basketball Association,"16 also
ridiculed the importance of a mandatory subject classification." 17 Echoing
Justice White's sentiments, Judge Carter stated that "there are limits to
what a union or an employer may offer or extract in the name of wages,
and because they must bargain does not mean that the agreement reached
may disregard other laws."" 8 Dismissing the league's labor exemption ar-
gument, Judge Carter stressed that '[m]andatory subjects of collective
bargaining' do not carry talismanic immunity from the antitrust laws.""19
He concluded by labeling the mandatory subject inquiry an irrelevance,
emphasizing that its use obscured the critical interests at stake. 20
McCourt v. California Sports, Inc.21 represents the only appellate court
application of the Mackey criteria outside the Eighth Circuit. '2 The Sixth
Circuit, in McCourt, reversed the lower court's denial of the labor exemption
by a two to one margin.' 23 In a powerful dissent, Chief Judge Edwards
denigrated the significance of a mandatory subject classification. Like Judge
Carter in Robertson, Chief Judge Edwards characterized the mandatory
subject inquiry as wholly illusory. 24 Explicitly rejecting Mackey's mandatory
subject criterion, Chief Judge Edwards pointed out the reliance on that
115. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65. Justice Goldberg, in a separate opinion which served
as a dissent in Pennington and a concurrence in Jewel Tea, argued for blanket exemption of
all negotiations concerning mandatory subjects of bargaining. 381 U.S. at 697. His reasoning,
however, never has been adopted by a majority of the United States Supreme Court. Even
Justice Goldberg recognized that:
[t]he direct and overriding interest of unions in such subjects as wages, hours,
and other working conditions, which Congress has recognized in making them
subjects of mandatory bargaining, is clearly lacking where the subject of the
agreement is price-fixing and market allocation. Moreover, such activities are at
the core of the type of anticompetitive commercial restraint at which the antitrust
laws are directed.
Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 732-33 (emphasis added).
116. Robertson challenged an alleged merger between the NBA and the ABA, and attacked
as illegal under the Sherman Act various NBA practices including the player draft, the option
clause in the uniform player contract and the NBA's compensation rule. 389 F.Supp. at 873-
76.
117. Id. at 886-89.
118. Id. at 888 (quoting Pennington, 381 U.S. at 664-65) (emphasis omitted).
119. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 888.
120. Id. at 889.
121. 600 F.2d 1193 (6th Cir. 1979).
122. This excludes, of course, the cursory review in Wood v. NBA, 602 F. Supp. 525
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). McCourt involved an unsuccessful player challenge to the inter-team com-
pensation scheme embodied in the National Hockey League's reserve system. 600 F.2d at 1195-
97.
123. McCourt v, California Sports, Inc. 460 F. Supp. 904 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
124. McCourt, 600 F.2d at 1215-16 (Edwards, C. J. dissenting).
[Vol. 62:95
FOULING OUT THE SALARY CAP
subject ignores the crucial policy concerns underlying organized labor's spe-
cial exemption from antitrust prosecution.,"
The mandatory subject inquiry is an improvident one. In the context of
professional basketball and the salary cap, labor interests are not sufficiently
implicated to warrant the inclusion of the mandatory subject criterion in the
balancing framework. Common sense, statutory construction, industry prac-
tice and pertinent case law all dictate against its application. The mandatory
subject requirement, therefore, should be omitted from the analysis.
2. The Third Party Effect Criterion
The salary cap primarily affects parties outside the immediate bargaining
unit: 26 potential first round draft choices who are not yet members of the
NBA and are not parties to the NBA-Players Association collective bar-
gaining agreement. 27 The prospective employee-future bargaining unit re-
lationship most frequently is encountered in the operation of the annual
player draft.2 8 By rough analogy, the draft typically is likened to its distant
industrial cousin, the hiring hall, 29 a device traditionally favored by courts. 30
In the hiring hall context, the interests of prospective employees are consid-
ered legitimate subjects of union concern. 3' Unions, as exclusive bargaining
representatives, thus may bargain away these prospective employees' rights.
125. Id. Chief Judge Edwards explained that:
[iit is easy to postulate situations where the profit interests of capital and the
wage-hour interests of labor could be mutually served by introducing into collective
bargaining agreements restrictions upon competition which are greatly contrary
to the public interest and have nothing to do with the labor interests protected
by the Clayton and Norris-LaGuardia Acts. In two instances where there was
labor-management agreement ... the Supreme Court struck down the restrictive
practices. Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
Id.
126. See supra text accompanying note 19.
127. See infra text accompanying note 146.
128. Player draft systems have sparked considerable academic debate. The legality of the
annual player draft is beyond the scope of this Note. For an interesting discussion of that
topic, see J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 553-54 (1979); McCormick &
McKinnon, supra note 4; Roberts & Powers, supra note 4, at 455-64.
129. Hiring hall arrangements sometimes are incorporated in union-employer collective bar-
gaining agreements. They provide the employer with an exclusive pool of skilled labor. The
union-operated hiring hail refers job applicants to employers on the basis of several factors
including work experience, seniority and residency status. Hiring halls often have been attacked
as discriminatory employment mechanisms. The Supreme Court generally has been unreceptive
to these challenges. See, e.g. Local 357, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667 (1961);
Houston Chapter Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. NLRB, 143 N.L.R.B. 409 (1963), enforced 349
F.2d 449 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1026 (1966). See also J. WEISTART & C.
LOWELL, supra note 128, at 562-63.
130. See Teamsters, 365 U.S. 667; Houston Chapter, 143 N.L.R.B. 409; Mountain Pacific
Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 119 N.L.R.B. 883 (1957).
131. Houston Chapter, 143 N.L.R.B. at 412.
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Commentators have seized upon this rationale to condone the obvious third
party repercussions of the player draft.3 2 An identical argument would be
forthcoming with respect to the salary cap's impact on top draft choices.
Whether top draft choices should be analogized to prospective employees
in the hiring hall sense is an issue of uncertain dimension. From an antitrust
perspective, this argument ignores reality and overlooks the unique product
characteristics of today's superstar athletes. 3 3 The product market in profes-
sional basketball is individual player services. 34 The salary cap represents a
significant intrusion on the marketing of those services. 35 Competition in
the product market is restrained, thereby inviting antitrust scrutiny. The
hiring hall decisions are completely inapposite. They are not concerned with
competition in the product market, but instead involve labor market disputes
and labor law principles. Applying these concepts to the NBA would con-
stitute an unwarranted extension of the industry-specific labor practice.
From a labor law perspective, the hiring hall analogy is deceptively ap-
pealing. In that context, the market in professional basketball consists of
active and prospective employees. The Players Association is the exclusive
bargaining representative for these employees. The interests of top round
draft choices correspondingly are subsumed within this classification. The
salary cap consequently does not affect parties outside the collective bar-
gaining relationship. Under this logic, Mackey's second indicium therefore
would be satisfied. 36
132. J. WEISTART & C. LOWELL, supra note 128, at 553-54; Hobel, The Expiration of
Collective Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports, 57 N.Y.U.L. RE. 164, 181 n.65
(1982).
133. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
135. See infra text accompanying note 202.
136. This exact logic implicitly was adopted by the D.C. District Court in Zimmerman v.
National Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986). Zimmerman involved an unsuc-
cessful player challenge to the National Football League's ("NFL") supplemental draft. That
draft impacted players under existing contracts with fledgling United States Football League
("USFL") franchises. Plaintiff, a former number one NFL draft selection, contended that the
supplemental draft constituted a concerted refusal to deal and a group boycott in violation of
section one of the Sherman Act.
Rejecting that claim, Judge Parker held that the labor exemption insulated defendant league
from Sherman Act scrutiny. In so doing, Judge Parker summarily dismissed plaintiff's argument
that prospective NFL members represent third parties outside the collective bargaining rela-
tionship. Relying on enigmatic dictum in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738, 744
(D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978), and placing heavy
emphasis on the Wood cursory labor exemption analysis, supra note 9, Judge Parker stated
that "[niot only present but potential future players for a professional sports league are parties
to the bargaining relationship.... As a potential NFL player, Zimmerman was part of the
collective bargaining relationship between the NFLPA and the NFL to the extent necessary for
purposes of the labor exemption." Zimmerman, 632 F. Supp. at 405.
Judge Parker's comments, while squarely on point, suggest a blatant misunderstanding of
relevant market operation. See infra notes 137-50 and accompanying text. See also supra note
9 and accompanying text.
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This reasoning is critically flawed in three respects. First, in the professional
basketball industry, the Players Association is not the exclusive bargaining
representative for NBA employees. The vast majority of labor-management
relations are conducted on an individual level, through the athlete's personal
bargaining representative, the player agent.' 37 In similar fashion, player as-
sociations in professional sports typically are concerned with fringe benefits
and side issues, not maximum salary constraints. Individual wage negotiation
is withdrawn from the collective bargaining process. 3 This removal consti-
tutes an industry-wide recognition of the unique product market character-
istics of the professional athlete.'3 9 Wage negotiation is considered the exclusive
province of the athlete-agent corporate bargaining entity. In these matters,
antitrust policy should prevail.
Finally, to follow the hiring hall example and include first round draft
choices in the collective bargaining unit seems anomalous. A cross-industry
analysis demonstrates the futility of this extension. Hiring halls are designed
to "eliminate wasteful, time consuming and repetitive searching for jobs by
individual workmen and haphazard uneconomical searches by employees."'140
The player draft and the salary cap serve no analogous purpose. These
devices instead create obstacles in an adjacent product market; they impose
employment barriers, rather than facilitate job searches.
Hiring hall arrangements also do not bind the potential worker. The
prospective employee may or may not accept the job to which he is referred.' 4'
No such option exists in professional basketball. Top draft choices are
presented with a take-it-or-leave-it employment offer. They may not decline
proffered employment simply because the drafting team exceeds cap limits. 42
The drafted star is unable to market his talents elsewhere. The NBA has a
monopoly on professional basketball; there is but one relevant market.
Hiring halls, moreover, are industry-specific employment mechanisms.
Judicial endorsement has been limited to settings where the collective bar-
gaining process cannot await the presence of workers on the jobsite. In these
industries employment turnover is frequent, job opportunities fluctuate in
response to seasonal demand and the employee is frequently a stranger to
the area where the work is to be performed. 43 Active and prospective
137. L. SOBEL, supra note 110, at 304.
138. Id. at 324. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
140. Mountain Pacific, 119 N.L.R.B. at 896 n.8.
141. Lowell, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Team Sport Industry, 38 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 34-35 (1973).
142. Under the existing collective bargaining agreement the draft pick may refuse to negotiate,
sit out one year and re-enter the following year's draft. There is, of course, no guarantee that
the exact procedure will not be duplicated. In the interim, the top round pick is forced to sit
idle while his market value diminishes and his skills erode. These were the precise concerns in
Wood, 602 F. Supp. 525. Brief for Leon Wood at 5-6, See supra note 85 and accompanying
text.
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employees are one and the same. These workers share a common interest
in securing industry-wide wage standards. In stark contrast, employment
conditions in the NBA are relatively permanent. Unlike their industrial
counterparts, top draft choices frequently remain with one club for the
duration of their careers. Long-term contracts are the norm and players
typically are identified with particular organizations. In addition, active
players and top round draft choices do not share common wage interests.
Under cap requirements, salary concerns of active and prospective employees
are diametrically opposed. Satisfying demands of top draft picks means
relegating interests of active employees to the point of trade, waiver or
unconditional release. 44
For all of the foregoing reasons, acceptance of the hiring hall-prospective
employee analogy seems inappropriate. Any resemblance between the first
round draft choice and the prospective employee in the hiring hall sense is
purely superficial. The question of whether prospective NBA employees are
parties to the collective bargaining relationship, furthermore, has been re-
solved. 145 Judge Carter has explicitly acknowledged that draft choices are
third parties outside the collective bargaining relationship.' 46
The salary cap works to the detriment of an adjacent product market:
top round draft choices. The impact on that market can be devastating, as
the following hypothetical example illustrates. Patrick Ewing, instead of
being selected by the New York Knickerbockers (a team with substantial cap
flexibility) is picked by the Los Angeles Clippers (a team substantially above
cap limits). Ewing, therefore, is forced to sign a one year, $75,000 contract.' 47
In the exhibition season Ewing sustains a career-ending injury. Instead of
having a guaranteed $31.2 million deal, 148 Ewing is left with $75,000 and a
143. Teamsters, 365 U.S. at 672; Houston Chapter, 143 N.L.R.B. at 412.
144. The salary cap undoubtedly creates an incentive for teams at established cap levels to
cut high-salaried veterans in favor of blue-chip draft prospects. Note, The National Basketball
Association Salary Cap: An Antitrust Violation?, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 157, 177 (1985). As the
Wood litigation unfolded, this consideration became patently obvious. See supra note 9.
In Wood, plaintiff sought a four year, $1 million guaranteed contract. The Philadelphia
76ers initially balked at this request. According to Pat Williams, general manager of the club,
cap constraints dictated that plaintiff receive only a one year $75,000 contract. Williams,
however, suggested that the Sixers would attempt "to move some of its end of the bench
people" and thereby "free up more first year money for Leon." Affidavit of Fred L. Slaughter,
Counsel for Plaintiff, at 3, September 7, 1984.
An ensuing roster shuffle bore out Williams' suggestion. On September 28, 1984, the Sixers
announced that plaintiff had signed a four year guaranteed contract reportedly worth $1.1
million. Wash. Post, Sept. 29, 1984, Sports at 2 (elec. ed.). To meet plaintiff's salary demands
and squeeze below cap limits, the Sixers released free-agent guard Franklin Edwards ($126,000
contract) and traded reserve forward Leo Rautins ($165,000 contract) to the Indiana Pacers.
McManis, The NBA is Learning to Live With the Salary Cap, L.A. Times, Oct. 25, 1984, pt.
3, at 1, col. 4.
145. Robertson, 389 F. Supp. at 889.
146. Id.
147. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 73.
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shattered dream. The union-negotiated salary cap deprives Ewing of his
prospective fortune. As a party outside the collective bargaining relationship,
Ewing undeniably has been affected by its terms. 149
The salary cap poses similar problems for every collegiate superstar drafted
by a team at or near the defined cap limit.'50 These individuals are denied
the opportunity to market their unique services. The third party effect is
obvious: the restraint on trade does not primarily affect the parties to the
agreement. Mackey's second prong, therefore, cannot be met.
3. The Bona Fide, Arm's-Length Bargaining Criterion
The salary cap provision embodied in the 1983 Memorandum of
Understanding' 5' also cannot satisfy the final requirement of the Mackey
standard.'5 2 This criterion presupposes lawful bargaining objectives.'53 The
salary cap is a cost-reduction tactic which eliminates competition in the
product market; it is analogous to per se pricing. 54 The labor exemption
never was intended to immunize such agreements. There clearly are limits
to the number of antitrust violations to which unions and employers may
agree.' 5 5 The labor exemption may not "be utilized as a cat's paw to pull
employer's chestnuts out of the antitrust fires."' 56 It is well established that
"a union forfeits its exemption from the antitrust laws when it is clearly
shown that it has agreed with one set of employers to impose a certain wage
scale on other bargaining units.' ' 57 The language of the case law could not
be more exact.
149. Such a hypothetical is not out of the ordinary. Smith, 593 F.2d 1173, involved an
identical factual scenario. In that instance, Smith prevailed in his antitrust claims against league
officials and the then-existing NFL draft. Id. at 1187.
150. These precise considerations recently were obviated by the tragic death of Len Bias,
University of Maryland All-American and number two selection in the 1986 NBA draft. Bias
was picked by the defending NBA champion Boston Celtics. Saddled with several long term
contract obligations, the Celtics admittedly were straitjacketed by cap requirements. These limits
would have drastically reduced Bias' earning capacity for the 1986-87 NBA season. Aftermath
of Bias Tragedy: Questions Left by his Death, USA Today, June 20, 1986, at 8, col. 4.
Cap constraints are wreaking similar havoc on contract negotiations between the New York
Knickerbockers and the number six selection in the 1986 NBA draft, University of Kentucky
All-American Kenny Walker. Walker's agent, Larry Fleischer, remains adamant in his refusal
to accept the Knick's cap-deflated offer. The Indianapolis Star, Sept. 26, 1986, at 41, col. 3.
Fleischer, who doubles as general counsel for the Players Association, conceivably may be
setting the stage for another round of salary cap litigation. See supra note 9. On several prior
occasions, Fleischer has voiced stem opposition to the salary cap. New York Times, Feb. 26,
1986, at 24, col. 1.
151. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10, at § III C(2) and 2(f).
152. See supra text accompanying note 19.
153. See supra note 115 and text accompanying note 118.
154. See infra text accompanying note 202.
155. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 294 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (quoting United States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Assn. 336 U.S. 460, 464
(1949)).
157. Pennington, 381 U.S. at 665.
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In other contexts, moreover, there are specific guidelines which define the
permissible scope of collective bargaining. The Fair Labor Standards Act,
for example, provides for maximum work weeks and minimum pay scales
which no collective bargaining agreement may undermine. 5  The Federal
Occupational Health and Safety Act similarly stipulates minimum working
standards that may not be bargained away. 59 Employer-union agreements
which derogate from these limits are subject to appropriate challenges.
The labor exemption is not a license to impose illegal market restraints.160
Union-employer agreements may not escape antitrust scrutiny under the guise
of national labor policy. The salary cap itself is inconsistent with bona fide
arm's-length negotiation; Mackey's final requirement thus cannot be satis-
fied.
Mackey's application undermines the labor exemption defense. Mackey,
however, simply represents a crude balance of divergent policy considera-
tions. In relation to the salary cap, it is a particularly cumbersome vehicle
to strike the policy balance. In that respect, Justice White's Jewel Tea
framework 6' is far better equipped to handle the peculiar intricacies of the
professional basketball industry.
C. The Salary Cap Under Justice White's Balance
Applying Justice White's framework to the salary cap agreement reinforces
the Mackey result and highlights the critical policy concerns. 62 The elimi-
nation of competition in the market for top round draft choices represents
the antitrust side of Justice White's balance. The salary cap is professional
basketball's answer to price fixing 63 which, in other industries, has been
condemned as per se violative of the Sherman Act.' 64 In other sports contexts,
moreover, the salary cap has been explicitly rejected as the most blatant
form of market intrusion.' 65 The anticompetitive repercussions of the cap
are plain. The antitrust side of the scale is weighted accordingly.
158. 29 U.S.C. § 206 (1982).
159. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1982).
160. See supra note 115 and text accompanying note 118.
161. See supra notes 35-61 and accompanying text. It should be noted that a test nearly
identical to Justice White's balancing approach implicitly was endorsed by the Robertson court.
389 F. Supp. at 889.
162. See supra notes 35-61 and accompanying text.
163. See infra text accompanying note 202.
164. See infra text accompanying note 201.
165. Reacting to an NBA-styled salary cap proposal, Donald Fehr, executive director of the
Major League [Baseball] Players Association, stated that:
[What this [salary cap] proposal does is functionally eliminate the free agent
market for players. ... Basically, what they [the owners] are saying is that they
will control salaries and there won't be a market for free agents. What this means
is that they will tell baseball players, "You will be denied the right to seek your
value on the free market .. " It's not ordinarily the way one does business in
this country.
Wash. Post, May 21, 1985, Sports, at 1 (elec. ed.).
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The labor portion of Justice White's balance incorporates two related
national labor policies:166 encouraging collective bargaining and advancing
union interests. Union interests clearly are not being served by the cap's
operation. The cap purportedly was designed to maximize players' free
agency options.' 6 Under the cap each team theoretically is required to pay
a minimum amount per year in salaries and benefits. This minimum floor
feature was intended to force teams below the cap to bid on free agents and
therefore raise salaries across the board. 6 This has not occurred. The league
instead unilaterally has interpreted the minimum floor feature to require the
teams, as a group, to pay the minimum in salaries and benefits. 69 As a
result, any incentive for teams below cap limits to pursue high-priced free
agents has been destroyed.17' As expected, the free agent market is at a
standstill.' 7' Rumors of collusion abound. 7 2 Union interest in the cap, con-
sequently, is at a nadir.' 7 The anticipated union benefit has not material-
ized. 74 The cap clearly works to the disadvantage of top rookies and free
agents.
The second half of the labor scale, encouraging collective bargaining, is
lacking in the substance if not in form. The cap obviously relates to wages,
a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.' 71 In the typical industrial
setting this fact would "weigh heavily in favor of antitrust exemption for
agreements on those subjects.' ' 76 In the professional basketball context,
166. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
167. Affidavit of Lawrence A. Fleischer, General Counsel for National Basketball Players
Association, at 6, 81 Civ. 6582 (RLC), Sept. 21, 1984.
168. See supra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
170. Id. Instead of the Utah Jazz, for example, being forced to add another million dollars
to its SI.9 million payroll, the league is saying that the money can be picked up from another
team with an already overinflated payroll. Cotton, NBA: The Boredom Is Over, Wash. Post,
Oct. 25, 1984, Sports, at 1 (elec. ed.). See supra text accompanying note 79.
171. Cotton, supra note 170, at 1.
172. Id. See also supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
173. Welling & Tasini, supra note 66, at 78.
174. This situation comes remarkably close to a hypothetical posed by Justice White in
Pennington, 381 U.S. 657. See supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text. There, White re-
marked:
If the UMW in this case, in order to protect its wage scale by maintaining employer
income, had presented a set of prices at which the mine operators would be
required to sell their coal, the union and the employers who happened to agree
could not successfully defend this contract provision if it were challenged under
the antitrust laws by the United States or by some party injured by the arrange-
ment.... In such a case, the restraint on the product market is direct and
immediate, is of the type characteristically deemed unreasonable under the Sher-
man Act and the union gets from the promise nothing more concrete than a hope
for better wages to come.
Pennington, 381 U.S. at 663 (emphasis added). In the instant setting, a Pennington-type
conspiracy directed against incoming draft choices is well within the realm of possibilities.
These were the precise allegations in Wood, 602 F. Supp. 525. See supra note 9. See also supra
note 70 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
176. Jewel Tea. 381 U.S. at 689.
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however, such a classification is irrelevant. 77 Wage negotiation in profes-
sional basketball is removed from the collective bargaining process; 78 col-
lective bargaining concerns correspondingly are limited. As was demonstrated
under Mackey, conditioning a grant of immunity on a subject traditionally
reserved to individual negotiation is highly incongruous. 79
Serious arm's-length bargaining, moreover, assumes lawful objectives.8 0
The salary essentially is a price fixing scheme.'"' The policy of the labor
exemption is not served by encouraging collective bargaining on illegal subject
matters.8 2 As Justice Black noted in Allen Bradley Co. v. Electrical Workers
Local 3:183
It would be a surprising thing if Congress, in order to prevent a mis-
application of that [antitrust] legislation to labor unions, had bestowed
upon such unions complete and unreviewable authority to aid business
groups to frustrate its primary objective. For if business groups, by
combining with labor unions, can fix prices ... it was little more than
a futile gesture for Congress to prohibit price fixing by business groups
themselves.'"
These sentiments were echoed in Kapp v. National Football League.8 Kapp
concerned a successful player challenge to the then-existing NFL draft,
standard contract rules and tampering provisions. Kapp asserted that these
measures were unreasonable restraints of trade in violation of the Sherman
Act. 8 6 In granting plaintiff's summary judgment motion, Judge Sweigart
emphasized there are
'limits to the antitrust violations to which labor and management can
agree.' We are of the opinion that, however broad may be the exemption
from antitrust laws of collective bargaining agreements dealing with
wages, hours and other conditions of employment, that exemption does
not and should not go so far as to permit immunized combinations to
enforce employer-employee agreements which, being unreasonable re-
strictions on an employee's right to freely seek and choose his employ-
ment, have been held illegal on grounds of public policy long before and
entirely apart from the antitrust laws."
177. See supra text accompanying notes 116-20.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 110-12 and text accompanying notes 137-40.
180. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
181. See infra text accompanying note 202.
182. Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 100, 421 U.S. 616, 622 (1975).
183. 325 U.S. 797 (1945).
184. Id. at 809-10.
185. 390 F. Supp. 73 (N.D. Cal. 1974), aff'd, 586 F.2d 644 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 907 (1979).
186. Id. at 78.
187. Id. at 86 (emphasis in original), quoting Flood, 407 U.S. at 294 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
Judge Sweigart's broad condemnation has been roundly criticized by commentators. It never-
theless is extremely useful in demonstrating that union-employer agreements may not ignore
other bodies of law. In that respect, it is the logical extension of policy cautions embodied in
the labor exemption line of cases. See supra notes 115-18 and accompanying text.
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The salary cap clearly falls within this proscription. It is a patently un-
reasonable restraint of trade. Concluding that the salary cap negotiations
were the type of collective bargaining envisioned by the framers of the
National Labor Relations Act'88 elevates form over substance. The collective
bargaining concern underlying the labor side of Justice White's balance
cannot be satisfied.
A situation therefore exists where neither national labor policy is advanced
by the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding. The corresponding product
market impact is "apparent and real."' 8 9 Under these circumstances the
resulting balance tips heavily in favor of antitrust concerns.' 9° The labor
exemption consequently fails to shield the salary cap agreement from Sher-
man Act standards.
IV. THE SALARY CAP UNDER SECTION ONE OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Section one of the Sherman Act,' 9' in pertinent part, provides that "every
contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states . . . is declared to be illegal."' 92 Attempts at dealing with
section one allegations fall into two distinct evaluative schools: per se
treatment'93 and rule of reason analysis.' 94
The rule of reason is the standard traditionally applied to the majority
of anticompetitive practices challenged under section one. 9 5 A rule of reason
analysis generally entails a detailed factual inquiry into the alleged anticom-
petitive behavior. Courts look to such factors as the particular industry
involved, the history of the restraint and the reasons why it was adopted in
applying a rule of reason test.' 9
There exists, in contrast, a limited number of practices "which because
of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of redeeming value are
conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal"' 97 without
the necessity for an elaborate factual inquiry into the alleged anticompetitive
behavior. These per se categories of proscribed behavior include tying
arrangements,' 98 group boycotts, 99 market allocations"' and price fixing. 20 '
188. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-69 (West 1973, 1978, Supp. 1981 & 1980 Laws Special Pamphlet).
See also supra note 2.
189. Jewel Tea, 381 U.S. at 691.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
191. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
192. Id.
193. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
194. Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
195. Continental T.V. Inc. v. G.T.E. Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
196. Chicago Bd., 246 U.S. at 238.
197. Northern Pac. Ry., 356 U.S. at 5.
198. Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
199. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
200. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
201. United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
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The business of professional basketball involves the acquisition of talented
players. This primarily is accomplished through the player draft system.
Within this framework, the salary cap is designed to lower the cost of doing
business. It restrains competitive bidding for top round draft choices. League
members effectively have eliminated competition inter se to reduce expenses.
This tactic is analogous to price fixing. A per se analysis ordinarily would
be the appropriate evaluative tool.20 2
In the professional sports industry, however, courts consistently have
cautioned against application of per se standards. 20 3 The unique nature of
the business militates against rigid adherence to per se rules fashioned in
other contexts. 204 There also exists a well established industry exception to
per se scrutiny which, if applicable, mandates a rule of reason inquiry. 20
Professional basketball, arguably, fits that exception. 2°6 These combined
considerations render per se treatment inappropriate. The salary cap thus is
entitled to a rule of reason analysis.
A. The Rule of Reason Analysis
The critical focus of the rule of reason test is "whether the restraint
imposed is justified by legitimate business purposes and is no more restrictive
than necessary." '2°7 The express objectives of the salary cap are to preserve
the financial integrity of the NBA and to improve competitive balance by
promoting the ability of financially weaker teams to compete on a more
equal basis with financially stronger teams. 20 8
202. Id.
203. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Com'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1387 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 397 (1984); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 619 (8th Cir. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977); Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey
Club, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 462, 503 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
204. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 619.
205. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963). To qualify for the Silver
exception it must. be demonstrated that:
(1) The industry structure requires self-regulation.
(2) The collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end consistent with the
policy to justify self-regulation, (b) is reasonably related to that goal, and (c) is no
more extensive than necessary.
(3) The association provides procedural safeguards which assure that the restraint
is not arbitrary and which furnish a basis for judicial review.
See United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 487 F. Supp. 1008, 1015-16 (N.D.
11. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981); Linseman v. World Hockey
Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (D. Conn. 1977).
206. Id. The intricacies of the Silver exception are beyond the scope of this Note. For
discussion purposes it is assumed that Silver would render per se treatment inappropriate. For
an excellent overview of Silver's application in a professional sports context, see McCormick
& McKinnon, supra note 4, at 421-36.
207. Mackey, 543 F.2d at 620.
208. Affidavit of Lawrence A. Fleischer, General Counsel, National Basketball Players As-
sociation, at 6, 81 Civ. 6582 (RLC) Sept. 21, 1984.
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An examination of these dual policy goals reveals that neither is able to
pass the rule of reason muster. The first justification, insuring financial
stability, may be dismissed outright. The salary cap agreement cannot be
saved by claims that the league would not survive in its absence. As the
Supreme Court noted in United States v. General Motors Corp.:209
exclusion of traders from the market by means of combination or con-
spiracy is so inconsistent with the free-market principles embodied in the
Sherman Act that it is not to be saved by reference to the need for
preserving the collaborators profit margins or their systems. ... 210
The NBA, moreover, unsuccessfully presented this identical argument in
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc. 211 Judge Ferguson, in Denver
Rockets, summarily rejected the financial necessity contention, stating that
"this does not provide a basis for exemption from antitrust laws.1 212 This
view was reiterated in Linseman v. World Hockey Association213 and im-
pliedly adopted in Robertson v. National Basketball Association.214
The second justification underlying the salary cap also is deficient. The
competitive balance argument previously has been rejected in two similar
contexts. In Mackey v. National Football League,215 a group of veteran NFL
players successfully challenged the league's "Rozelle Rule. ' 21 6 This provision
precluded a player from moving freely between teams upon the expiration
of his contract. The NFL contended that elimination of the rule would
destroy competitive balance throughout the league and "ultimately lead to
diminished spectator interest, franchise failures and ... the demise of the
NFL. ' 21 7 The Eighth Circuit disposed of this argument, emphasizing that
competitive balance could be achieved in some less restrictive manner. 28 The
209. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
210. Id. at 146.
211. 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971). In Denver Rockets, plaintiff basketball star
successfully challenged the NBA's hardship rule. That rule required graduating high school
seniors to wait four years before becoming eligible for the NBA draft.
212. Id. at 1066.
213. 439 F. Supp. 1315 (D. Conn. 1977). Linseman concerned the legality of a World Hockey
Association ("WHA") rule prohibiting hockey players under twenty years of age from competing
in the WHA. The league argued that the rule was necessary for the financial survival of minor
league systems feeding into the WHA. Rejecting that contention, Judge Clarie stated that "the
antitrust laws do not admit of exceptions due to economic necessity." Id. at 1322.
214. 389 F. Supp. 867 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Judge Carter emphasized that "because [financial]
survival necessitates some restraints ... does not mean that insulation from the reach of the
antitrust laws must follow. Less drastic protective measures may be the solution." Id. at 892.
For similar holdings in other industries, see Knutson v. Daily Review, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 1346
(N.D. Cal. 1974) (newspaper distribution), affd in part, rev'd in part, 548 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 910 (1977) and United States v. Nat'l Wholesale Druggist, 61 F.
Supp. 590 (D.N.J. 1945) (pharmaceuticals).
215. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
216. Id. at 623.
217. Id. at 621.
218. Id. at 622.
19861
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, in Smith v. Pro Football,21 9
similarly discarded the competitive balance contention. 20 Smith concerned
a successful player challenge to the then-existing NFL player draft. The NFL
asserted that the draft was necessary for competitive balance on the field.2
Rejecting this theory, Judge Wilkey permanently laid to rest the competitive
balance argument. He stated that:
the purpose of antitrust analysis ... is to form a judgment about the
competitive significance of the restraint; it is not to decide whether a
policy favoring competition is in the public interest, or in the interest of
members of an industry ... The NFL defenses, premised on the assertion
that competition for player services would harm both the football industry
and society are unavailing, there is nothing of procompetitive virtue to
balance because the "Rule of Reason" does not support a defense based
on the assertion that competition itself is unreasonable.m
The competitive balance defense realistically is nothing more than wishful
thinking on the part of the NBA. Under the salary cap, pre-cap salaries are
grandfathered;223 teams that were far above present cap limits prior to the
1983 agreement remain in that position. The agreement essentially has locked
certain teams into pre-1983 competitive bidding postures. It is not surprising
that Los Angeles, Philadelphia and Boston, perennial league powerhouses,
stand atop the league payroll charts. The rich are, in fact, getting richer.
Aside from this paradox, the primary justification underlying the cap, that
of promoting the ability of financially weaker teams to compete in the free
agent market224 is being thwarted by league fiat. 225 These combined consid-
erations further demonstrate the inadequacy of the competitive balance ar-
gument.
The salary cap unreasonably restrains competition in the market for top
round draft choices. Under a rule of reason analysis, this direct market
restraint is not mitigated by legitimate business purposes. The salary cap
provision embodied in the 1983 Memorandum of Understanding"' 6 therefore
violates section one of the Sherman Act. 227
219. 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978), modifying 420 F. Supp 738 (1976).
220. Id. at 1197.
221. Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 745.
222. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186-87 (quoting National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United
States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978)).
223. Welling, Tasini & Cook, Basketball: Business is Booming, Bus. WK. Oct. 28, 1985, at
78. This fact accounts for the great disparity among current NBA payrolls. The salaries of
teams' unsigned free agents also do not count against cap limits. Id. This partially explains
how the New York Knickerbockers were able to offer Patrick Ewing the bank without violating
cap requirements. See supra note 73.
224. See supra text accompanying note 208.
225. See supra text accompanying notes 78-81 and notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
226. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 10.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
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CONCLUSION
The collective bargaining process often yields unwieldy results, as evidenced
by the 1983 salary cap agreement. Proponents of the cap claim that it
represents a landmark labor triumph unprecedented in the annals of profes-
sional sports. Detractors argue that the cap constitutes an indiscriminate
market restraint imposing severe hardships on top round draft choices.
Reconciling these conflicting attitudes is a matter of balancing antitrust
concerns against labor policy objectives. The crucial inquiry becomes to what
extent is the product of the collective bargaining process immune from
antitrust scrutiny. The professional basketball industry provides an interesting
factual backdrop to grapple with this ubiquitous policy balance.
The Mackey" 8 framework was developed to handle this labor-antitrust tug
of war. Despite its limits229 Mackey lays the groundwork for a critical
appraisal of the salary cap agreement. Application of the Mackey standard
renders the labor exemption unavailable. 230 Justice White's balancing frame-
work supplements the Mackey analysis, reinforces its result and pinpoints
the essential policy considerations.
2 3
'
The salary cap agreement clearly violates section one of the Sherman
Act.2 3 2 A rule of reason analysis demonstrates that the cap's anticompetitive
market consequences are not justified by legitimate business concerns. 233 At
the next union negotiation, the Players Association has indicated that it will
fight to end the cap.23 4 Until that time, the salary cap will scream for judicial
attention.
D. ALBERT DAsPIN
228. Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976), cerl. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
229. Mackey's attractiveness inheres in its ease of application. Mackey's usefulness, however,
is constrained by precisely the same feature. See supra text accompanying notes 105-26.
230. See supra notes 103-61 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 162-90 and accompanying text.
232. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
233. See supra notes 208-27 and accompanying text.
234. Welling, Tasini & Cook, Basketball: Business is Booming, Bus. WK. Oct. 28, 1985, at
78.
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